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Introduction 
Five rounds of enlargement have now been completed. The original European Economic 
Community has grown from Six to Twenty-Five members and the process has not yet 
come to an end. Still, we know very little about how enlargement processes work and 
how their effects are felt by and transmitted to the European Union. Despite the latest 
contributions to the literature on enlargement (some of them outstanding, such as Friis, 
1998; Sedelmeier, 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2003a; and Sjursen, 2002), and despite 
overwhelming evidence of the profound impact which successive enlargement processes 
have had on the European Union, there are still many reasons to subscribe the lament of 
Schmitter (2001) and Wallace (2000) concerning the peripheral location of enlargement 
studies in the field of European integration theory. 
 
Back in 1972, Donald Puchala (1972) offered a remarkable analogy between the 
scientific study of the process of European integration and the classic Indian tale of the 
three blind men: each described to the other two what an elephant looked like after 
having touched three completely different parts of the animal (the trunk, an ear and a 
foot). Despite the time that has elapsed, in this article we argue that the analogy is still 
valid to describe the problems faced by the academic community when attempting to 
tackle the enlargement processes. 
 
Looking at enlargement, rational institutionalists describe a world in which actors seek to 
maximize their economic or security preferences. When preferences conflict, actors resort 
to negotiations in order to distribute the benefits or accommodate the costs. Accordingly, 
results tend to merely reflect the distribution of power among the participants and the 
underlying or manifest asymmetries of power. At the aggregate level, enlargement could 
then be modelled as a power game in which the EU seeks to maximize the benefits of an 
expanding membership in terms of economic, political and security gains and, at the 
same time, minimize the costs of accepting new members (in terms of the budgetary, 
economic and political impact of the new members on the EU’s economy, budget and 
institutions). At the member state level, the story is not so different: each member state 
tries to maximize its share of the collective benefits of enlargement and minimize its 
contribution to the costs, even at the expense of obtaining suboptimal results at the 
collective level (Moravscik and Vachudova, 2003). 
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A second observer, however, might be tempted to describe a completely different 
scenario. Impressed by the generosity showed by the European Union in welcoming ten 
new members despite their negative contribution to the EU’s per capita GDP, their acute 
financial needs in terms of structural funds or agricultural subsidies, their more than weak 
political cultures and their heavy impact on the efficiency of the EU’s institutional system, 
Puchala’s second blind man would naturally be tempted to see a feeling of shared 
identity, a hint of common purpose, a common understanding of history, tradition or 
political values, as the main force driving enlargement policies. Enlargement could then 
be considered proof of the existence of a different logic, a logic of appropriateness under 
which the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of new democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe would have led EU members to put aside material considerations and act 
according to their historic and moral responsibilities towards the peoples with which they 
share a common identity. 
 
A third observer, observing the controversies surrounding the selection of candidates, the 
reluctance concerning the dates of admission and the debates regarding the criteria for 
membership, would not feel quite as impressed by the EU’s rhetoric about the 
reunification of Europe, and be even less easily convinced by the explanatory power of 
the EU’s collective identity as the engine of enlargement. Looking at how the EU has 
developed its doctrine on enlargement as it progressed, adapting it case by case to fit the 
requirements of each new situation while, at the same time, seeking to preserve some 
principles which everybody could agree to (the democratic conditionality clause, the need 
to preserve the EU by maintaining the integrity of the acquis communautaire), our third 
blind man would be tempted to argue in favour of considering enlargement a typical 
deliberative process in which actors exchange arguments about the best course of action 
and seek to justify their policy positions in terms of some universally valid principles 
(democracy, peace, etc) rather than in terms of relative power or costs of benefits. 
 
In the following sections we shall further explore these three visions of the EU and 
enlargement. Our aim is not to thoroughly test each and every one of them, as that would 
require deriving specific hypotheses and developing clear empirical markers for 
adjudicating particular pieces of evidence. Rather, we seek to convince researchers in 
the field about the need to engage in a thorough exploration of the avenues for both 
theoretical analysis and empirical research. At the end of the day, the three 
conceptualisations we offer might only amount to ‘visions’, rather than to ‘theories’, but 
might help to improve, expand and deepen our understanding of the phenomenon of 
enlargement in more significant ways. 
 
The article is structured as follows. The first section provides a theoretical description of 
the three logics. Then, in section two, we examine enlargement from the prism of rational 
choice theories. Next, we propose two complementary visions of enlargement based 
respectively on identities and arguments. Finally, we conclude with some observations on 
the relative value and merit of each of the three approaches to illustrate the kind of polity 
the EU might become as a result of its enlargement processes. 
 
1. The Three Logics of Political Action 
Two metatheoretical approaches have typically been used to analyze interstate 
interactions: rational choice and constructivism. These have further been applied to the 
study of the dynamics of the European Union and its integration process, as well as to the 
type of polity it is becoming. Each of them emphasizes a different logic as accounting for 
a certain political action or policy, a distinctive mode of social action and interaction, and 
a particular consideration of the nature and goals of the actors. In the following sections 
they will be depicted for analytical purposes as pure forms, although in real life they 
appear combined and are quite difficult to separate. 
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The Logic of Consequentiality 
Under the premises of rational choice theories such as liberalism (Moravcsik, 1997) and 
neo-realism (Baldwin, 1993), actors’ decisions are considered to be basically guided by a 
logic of consequentiality (Elster, 1984; March and Olsen, 1989; Eriksen, 1999). On 
reaching agreements, states a priori define their preferences about the different options 
with reference to their particular interests, and act according to them in a basically 
technical environment (Scott, 1991), where bargaining is the common procedure to 
resolve disputes (Elster, 1992; Schimmelfennig, 2003b). Actors are taken to be rational 
when they pursue their welfare with their actions and engage in interaction in order to 
improve their position. They can induce the others to accept their claims through 
coercion, compensation or persuasion. Therefore, the outcome depends on the 
distribution of power and individual preferences, as well as on the negotiating capabilities 
of the participants. 
 
A particular strand of rational choice, rational institutionalism, applies these assumptions 
to institutional environments given that the structure and functioning of an organization 
can set limits or offer opportunities to its members to behave strategically (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996; Garret and Tsebelis, 1996; Schneider and Aspinwall, 2001). Political 
institutions are seen as consequences of political action, practical devices to enforce 
agreements and solve collective action dilemmas. As far as the European Union is 
concerned, the relevant actors are considered to be the member states’ governments, 
who base their respective positions on the expected consequences of a specific political 
action, defining their preferences before the decision-making process sets off and, 
thenceforward, acting in a strategic way in order to maximize their gains. 
 
For constructivist theories (Checkel, 2001; Egeberg, 1999; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1999), 
however, political action cannot be exclusively explained according to rationalist 
premises. Actions, they posit, are guided by principles, norms and identities, not only by 
self-interest. By creating and re-creating our identities, institutions shape our preferences 
and fully condition the type of outcomes which result from the interaction of the actors 
concerned. In other words, while in rational institutionalism, institutions are consequences 
of political action, for constructivists, institutions are understood as causes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Table 1. Comparison of Three Logics of Political Action 
 Consequentiality Appropriateness Justification 
Logic States act purposefully 
to reach their 
objectives, which are 
set a priori as a result 
of the anticipation of 
the consequences of a 
decision. 
States act according to 
their role within a 
community as a result 
of habit or a particular 
identity. 
States seek to reach 
an agreement through 
the assessment of 
arguments deemed 
legitimate by all parties 
involved. 
Legitimation Efficiency 
Collective decisions 
seek to promote the 
interests and 
preferences of the 
member states and 
solve their problems 
more efficiently. 
Identity 
Collective decisions 
seek to develop and 
protect the sense of 
‘we-ness’ and to 
establish bonds of 
solidarity. 
Justice 
Collective decisions 
seek to establish a fair 
system of co-operation 
founded on 
fundamental rights and 
democratic 
procedures. 
Justification Utility 
A policy decision is 
justified because of its 
efficacy to reach a goal 
and improve the states’ 
welfare. 
Values 
A policy decision can 
be justified as long as 
it is appropriate 
according to the 
shared values and 
common identity. 
Rights 
A policy decision is 
considered legitimate 
when respecting 
universally-valid 
principles of human 
rights and democratic 
procedures. 
Rationality Instrumental 
Actors are considered 
rational when their 
actions pursue their 
material and ideal 
welfare. 
Contextual 
Actors are considered 
rational when their 
actions derive from the 
conception of self in a 
social role. 
Communicative 
Actors are considered 
rational when they are 
able to explain and 
justify their actions. 
Outcome Compromise 
None of the parties 
gets exactly what he 
wants, but each 
regards the result as 
better than no outcome 
at all. It all depends on 
relative power and 
national preferences. 
Collective self-
understanding 
It expresses self-
reflection and resolve 
regarding a way of life. 
Rational consensus 
Agreement is sought 
on the better 
argument, that which 
convinces all the 
incumbents because it 
defines the right thing 
to do according to 
universally-valid 
standards. 
Source: prepared from concepts developed in Elster, 1992; Elster, 2000; Eriksen, 1999; Eriksen, 
2003; Eriksen and Fossum, 2003; Fossum, 2000; Habermas, 1996; March and Olsen, 1998; 
Moravcsik, 1998 and Sjursen, 2002. 
 
The Logic of Appropriateness 
According to the logic of appropriateness, actors, on making a decision, do not only 
consider what is better for them but what they are expected to do, ie, the roles and norms 
to be applied (March and Olsen, 1989). The causal mechanisms offered to explain how 
principles and norms might influence a negotiation process vary depending on the 
theoretical frameworks1. Whereas historic institutionalism highlights the role of previous 
institutional commitments in defining state preferences and determining future policies –
path dependence– (Pierson, 1995), sociological institutionalism stresses the constitutive 
effect of norms and principles, which are internalized by the members of the organization 
                                                          
1 The main features of historic and social institutionalism are also described in Hall and Taylor, 1996 and 
Schneider and Aspinwall, 2001. The three different types of justification are analyzed in detail in Fossum, 
2000. 
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so that preferences are set and decisions are taken according to them (Parsons, 2000; 
Johnston, 2001). Within this approach, the rationality of the actors is considered 
contextual, rather than instrumental, and deriving from the identity of the community they 
belong to. ‘Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities 
to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing 
similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of 
self and situations’ (March and Olsen, 1998, 951). The criteria for social action 
justification rely on values stemming from a particular cultural context and salient 
concerns of the decision-making process have to do with the search for collective self-
understanding and the building of a common identity, which can serve as the basis for 
developing stable goals and visions. Collective decisions are a matter of identity, rather 
than efficiency, seeking to develop and protect the sense of ‘we-ness’ and to establish 
bonds of solidarity. 
 
The Logic of Justification 
A new approach based upon the theory of the communicative action (Heath, 2001; 
Habermas, 1996), the ‘power of language’ and the effects of speech acts (Kratochwil, 
1989), has been developed more recently. Rather than on the motivational factors which 
account for a political action (interests, values, etc), the focus here is placed upon the 
features of the institutional setting which prompt actors to agree upon certain principles 
and norms and comply with them in the absence of coercion and how this comes to 
occur. 
 
When a decision is taken in a collective communicative process (as opposed to a 
negotiating one), actors try to seek a consensus on factual and normative matters, that is: 
(1) on the actual situation and the cause-and effect relationships between goals and 
means; and (2) on which norms apply under given circumstances or which principles 
should guide the policy under discussion. The distinctive mode of communication is 
arguing, rather than bargaining, which implies that actors try to challenge the validity 
claims inherent in any factual or normative statements and seek to reach agreement 
around the ‘better argument’. For factual statements, validity means the same as truth. 
For normative statements ‘impartiality and consistency are necessary conditions for 
validity’ (Elster, 1992). 
 
State preferences cannot be taken as given, but rather as built-in in the discursive 
settings of the institution: an appeal to values sparks a public discourse on what the 
relationship between policy and value should be, raising normative expectations (Eriksen 
and Fossum, 2000). As a consequence, actors are considered rational not only when 
they act according to their interests but also when they comply with norms and principles 
accepted by all and when they are able to explain and justify their actions (Habermas, 
1993). A communicative conception of rationality ‘does not solely designate consistency 
or preference-driven action based on calculus of success, nor merely norm-conformity or 
accordance with entrenched standards of appropriateness, but rather public reason-
giving: when criticised plans of action can be justified by explicating the relevant situation 
in a legitimate manner’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 2003, 4). It also implies that the participants 
in a discourse are open to being persuaded by the better argument, with power 
relationships thereby receding into the background (Habermas, 1981, 141-151). ‘Where 
argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their given 
interests and preferences, but to challenge and to justify the validity claims inherent in 
them and they are prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in 
the light of the better argument’ (Risse, 2000, 7). 
 
Public deliberation is about what is the right thing to do, ie, the warrant notion for 
legitimacy is justice, rather than identity or efficiency. Collective decisions seek to 
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establish a fair system of co-operation founded on fundamental rights and democratic 
procedures for deliberation and decision-making. A policy or political action is considered 
legitimate when it is agreed following a deliberative process where all parties must defend 
their stances in terms accepted and considered legitimate by all, regardless (or in spite) 
of their utility and shared identity. 
 
Having briefly discussed the basic features of each of the three logics, we will now 
examine the relative value of each in explaining both the process and the outcome of the 
EU’s Eastern enlargement policy. 
 
 
2. Eastern Enlargement from the Perspective of EU Interests 
Imagine that one of Puchala’s three blind men referred to in the introduction were only to 
care about maximizing utility, be it in seeking increased security, extensive economic 
benefits or increased political power within the EU’s institutions. We would then expect 
the process of Eastern enlargement to have been dominated by an instrumental type of 
rationality. State preferences should have been clearly defined from the beginning on the 
basis of the calculation of the costs and benefits of the various policy options. 
Accordingly, national governments would have acted as utility-maximizers and done what 
was most beneficial to their interests. 
 
Insofar as enlargement was a costly process and its costs were asymmetrically 
distributed (some countries would benefit more than others) and taking into account that it 
was a decision to be carried through unanimously at the European Council level, we 
would expect the decisional process to have been long and cumbersome, crammed with 
bargaining elements such as veto threats, side-payments and linkages between different 
issue-areas. Besides, the enlargement process itself would have been slow and 
restrictive, the admission of each candidate and the path of accession being determined 
by the balance of costs and benefits of each acceding country, ie, the richer and/or less 
costly candidates should be admitted first, the poorer and more costly later. Let us see 
whether Eastern enlargement fits this rationalist perspective by examining, first, the 
decision to enlarge, then, the pre-accession process, and thirdly, the enlargement 
negotiations themselves. 
 
The Decision to Enlarge (1989-93) 
Adopting this perspective, the decision to enlarge the EU eastwards might be regarded 
as a collective decision to promote the interests and preferences of the member states 
and solve the problems posed by the new situation in Central and Eastern Europe in a 
more efficient way. After the war in Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the USSR, 
geopolitical, economic and security interests made it impossible for the EU, even if it so 
wished, to turn its back on Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the geopolitical 
stabilization and economic revitalization of the European borderlands would dampen 
nationalist conflict and make illegal immigration more manageable (Moravscik and 
Vachudova, 2003). On the other hand, once enlargement was successfully concluded, 
the EU would gain greater clout as a global geopolitical actor, raising its status in the 
eyes of the United States, Russia and Asia (Grieco, 1996, 284 in Schimmelfennig 2000). 
 
From the economic point of view, the benefits of enlargement are also quite evident 
(Baldwin et al., 1997; Estrin and Holmes, 1998). The increase of trade and capital flows in 
the candidate countries after accession will also increase their potential for growth, which 
will further enhance imports from the EU-15, thereby positively contributing to the EU’s 
GNP. The advantages of a larger market will be enhanced by the fact that the supply of 
cheaper resources and cheaper but qualified labour as well as economies of scale will 
lead to higher efficiencies stemming from higher competition, a better allocation of 
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resources and higher specialisation, thereby strengthening European competitiveness in 
the world market. Thus, enticing Central Eastern Europe into a long-term process of 
economic and political reforms with the carrot of accession to the EU at the end was the 
option which best served both the EU’s geopolitical and security interests. 
 
Still, enlargement was a risky business: it would increase heterogeneity, it would 
complicate decision-making, it would entail higher administrative costs, it would require 
additional financial resources, and it could lead to a collapse or slowdown of the 
integration process and the weakening or disappearance of certain common policies, 
especially agricultural and structural policies. Moreover, some member states would not 
benefit as much as others from the process (depending on their proximity, socio-
economic ties with the CEEC, the structure of their external trade and national product) 
and would lose weight and capacity for action within the Union. As a consequence, a 
large majority of EC member states refused to endorse the membership aspirations of 
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the result being that the preamble of the 
association agreements signed in December 1991 only made reference to the wish of the 
candidate countries to become members in the future, but not to the EC’s acceptance of 
this goal as a shared one (which had been a standard clause in past association 
agreements with Greece and Turkey). Equally, the EU’s reluctance to liberalize its trade 
in sensitive sectors (coal and steel, textiles and agriculture) with its associates and the 
numerous compensations, negative linkages and veto threats dominating the 
negotiations (Torreblanca, 2001, 235-76) spoke clearly of the underlying logic behind 
association negotiations. As Sedelmeier (2000, 174) concluded: ‘the conduct of the 
negotiations and their final outcome on this issue was fairly close to what rationalist 
approaches would expect. In the intra-EU debate, the member governments’ positions 
seemed to reflect the cost/benefit calculations of the longer-term implications that such an 
acknowledgment of the CEECs’ eventual membership would entail’. 
 
Therefore, in order to make enlargement possible, it was imperative first to achieve a 
more efficient enlargement policy which better satisfied the preferences of a majority of 
EU member states. This obviously required reassuring the reluctant member states about 
the sustainability of the European integration process as well as ensuring a thorough 
compensation for the most negatively-affected members in order to obtain their support 
for enlargement. The European Agreements signed in December 1991, the Maastricht 
Treaty and the approval in Edinburgh in October 1992 of the 1993-99 financial 
perspectives (which doubled EU structural expenditure in the poorer member states) 
were crucial to allow the transition from a EU foreign policy based upon only a ‘special 
relationship’ with the incipient Eastern democracies to a policy of enlargement (yet with 
very severe conditions and no commitment on dates). 
 
The pre-accession Process (1993-97) 
The Commission’s report on enlargement for the Lisbon European Council in June 1992 
acknowledged that while the CEECs were not yet in a position to accept the obligations of 
membership, they had political needs which went beyond the possibilities of existing 
agreements. A year later, the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 declared that 
‘the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
members of the European Union’2. 
                                                          
2 ‘... as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the 
economic and political conditions required… Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
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By placing the prospect of membership clearly on the table, the June 1993 Copenhagen 
decision opened a new phase in EU/EC relations with the associate countries. However, 
it soon disappointed those who expected the decision to prompt a cascade of high-profile 
political decisions aimed at making accession a reality at the earliest possible moment. 
Rather, member states actually relaxed their commitment to Central Eastern Europe and 
concentrated on other problems (such as the accession negotiations of Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and Norway and the launch of the 1995 Reflection Group which is to prepare the 
1996 IGC on the institutional reforms necessary to cope with enlargement). As time went 
by, it became clear that the Copenhagen decision was aimed more at protecting the 
integration process from a speedy enlargement process than at creating the necessary 
framework to facilitate its execution. This became apparent in how, before deciding when 
and with whom to start the negotiations in a strict sense, the EU devoted every effort, 
first, to reduce the economic, political and security costs of enlargement and, secondly, to 
accommodate internally the particular interests of those member states that were more 
reluctant to enlargement. 
 
The first policy-game dealt not so much with (re)distributing the costs of enlargement, but 
with lowering them. By forcing the candidates to solve their border and minority problems 
in accordance with the conventions of the Council of Europe and the agreements reached 
in multilateral institutions such as the OSCE, the Balladur Pact on Stability launched in 
1993-95 aimed at reducing the threat posed by the spread of ethno-nationalism in the 
region following the Yugoslav outbreak3. Also, by preparing the candidates for accession 
well in time (with the pre-accession strategy agreed on in Essen in December 1994) and 
by compelling the candidates to implement the EU’s acquis communautaire dealing with 
the internal market well before accession (by way of the 1995 White Paper on the Internal 
Market), EU firms would be able to reap the economic benefits of enlargement in 
advance (both in terms of efficiency gains derived from the expansion of trade and 
foreign direct investment), generating enough economic growth in the region so as to 
help stabilize the new governments and deter massive immigration to the EU. 
 
The second dimension of this wide exercise of accommodation of costs included, first, the 
setting up of a new Mediterranean policy to compensate from the Drang nach Osten 
which enlargement would mean. Secondly, the launch of a treaty-reform process in order 
to adapt EU institutions to the challenge of enlargement (or to put it more bluntly, to 
ensure that the largest member states, and not the small and over-represented EU 
member states, would run the show after enlargement)4. 
 
Having tackled these issues, the European Council meeting in Madrid in December 1995 
could therefore refer to an enlargement calendar for the first time (including an important 
‘if’ condition linking enlargement and institutional reform): accession negotiations could 
                                                                                                                                                                               
union… The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration, is also an important consideration’ (European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, 
Presidency Conclusions’, Europe Documents, 1844/45) 
3 The French proposal was first examined by the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993. 
The Conference of the Stability Pact finally met in Paris on 21-22 March 1995. See the Presidency 
Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Cannes, 26-27 June 1995, SN 211/95, Part A, II, p.9. See 
also the ‘Synthesis Report on the Stability Pact’ submitted to the European Council meeting in Brussels on 
10-11 December 1993, document SN 373/93 
4 See also: IGC 1996, Report of the Reflection Group, ‘Improving the functioning of the European Union’. 
Brussels, 5 December 1995; Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
‘The European Union Today and Tomorrow, Adapting the European Union for the Benefit of Its Peoples 
and Preparing for the Future: A General Outline for a Draft Revision of the Treaties’ (Dublin II). CONF 
2500/96, Brussels, 5 December 1996, Part A, Section IV – The Union’s Institutions, pp. 90-126 
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start six months after the satisfactory conclusion of the intergovernmental conference to 
reform the treaties5. 
 
The remaining misgivings were removed in July 1997, when the Commission published 
the reports requested by the Madrid Council entitled Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and 
Wider Union delivering its opinions on the candidates; a framework enlargement strategy 
in order to guarantee that the acquis would be applied fully upon accession through 
Accession Partnerships; an impact study over EU common policies and the options for 
their reform, especially agriculture and structural funds, and options for reform; as well as 
a proposal for financial prospects for the following period (2000-2006). Although it gave 
rise to a fierce debate about the most sensitive questions involved in enlargement, it 
provided a very realistic reference-point and suggested a medium-term perspective of 
around five years (not before 2002) and the recommendation to start negotiations with 
the so-called ‘pre-ins’, ie, the candidates who better fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, 
namely Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. At the same time, it 
guaranteed the continuity of the agricultural and structural policies in spite of 
enlargement, calming down the most would-be affected incumbents.6
 
Having largely reduced or accommodated the costs of enlargement, the Luxembourg 
European Council in December 1997 could set in motion the official opening of 
negotiations with the ‘pre-ins’ recommended by the Commission. A majority of member 
states supported the selection of the first round of candidates. At the same time, the 
possibility of catching up later on, according to relative merit, was left open in order to 
please the member states who had been in favour of a ‘regatta’ principle (by which 
negotiations would be opened at the same time with all parties). Hence, all member 
states could live with the Luxembourg decision of opening accession negotiations in 
March 1998 despite not having yet dealt in depth with the most sensitive issue of 
institutional reform7. 
 
Accession Negotiations 
The third and last phase of the enlargement process covered accession negotiations 
between EU member states and the candidate countries. Once again, two dimensions 
can be distinguished: the external and the internal. 
 
On the external front, most of the responsibility was borne by the European Commission, 
which had to discuss with the candidates their capacity to adopt and implement the EU 
acquis communautaire, which extended over thirty chapters of EU legislation covering all 
fields of the political, economic and social life of the candidate countries8. In practice, 
since these negotiations took place under the principle of the integrity of the acquis 
(meaning that the only possible outcome of the negotiations was the full application of the 
acquis by the new members) and, at the same time, were presided by an overwhelming 
bargaining asymmetry between the EU and the candidates (the latter lacking any credible 
capacity to threaten withdrawal in order to obtain a better agreement), the talks could 
                                                          
5 ‘European Council in Madrid, 15-16 December 1995, Presidency Conclusions’, SN 400/95. 
6 European Commission (1997), ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications, Luxembourg. 
7 ‘European Council in Luxembourg, 12 and 13 December 1997, Presidency conclusions’, IP 97/24, 
European Union Enlargement. 
8 ‘Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia signed in Athens on 16 April, 2003. Brussels, 3 April 2003, AA 2003 final’. See also, 
‘Report on the results of the negotiations on the accession of Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to the European Union’, European 
Commission, 2004 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/negotiations_report_to_ep.pdf). 
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hardly be considered real negotiations. As all acceding countries have historically 
experienced, the results of the negotiations were highly frustrating for the candidates: the 
EU would fiercely fight both to reduce to the minimum the length of the transitional 
periods which the candidates requested in order to fully apply the acquis in a given field 
(eg, environmental regulations, land acquisition, etc) and, at the same time, to extend to 
the maximum the length of the transitional periods which it granted itself in order to 
extend the full benefits of EU membership to the candidates (eg, with respect to 
agricultural support, regional funding and the free circulation of labour). Therefore, once 
again, the EU would act predominantly guided by motives of self-interest and cost-
minimization. 
 
Given the fact that the 1999 Berlin agreement on the 2000-06 financial perspectives had 
set a ceiling on EU expenditure of 1.27% of EU GDP, meaning that enlargement was to 
be financed with the existing financial resources, it was no surprise that the most time-
consuming and difficult negotiations between the fifteen Members States revolved around 
the distribution of enlargement costs. Tension reached a peak in April 2001, when the 
Spanish government, seeing how its regions would lose access to EU funds by way of 
the so-called ‘statistical effects’ of enlargement, threatened to oppose Germany’s request 
to impose a seven-year transitional phase to prevent workers from the new members to 
freely establish themselves in its territory9. The incident had no further consequences but 
proved what the logic of negotiation was: a logic of threats in which outcomes were solely 
determined by the relative power of the participants. 
 
With the cohesion countries having been defeated in their attempt to finance enlargement 
with additional resources, the end-game of enlargement (Friis and Jarosz-Friis, 2002) 
was, once again, about both reducing the costs of enlargement (by denying, postponing 
or capping the benefits of EU agricultural and structural policies to the candidates) and 
accommodating them internally (by negotiating the distribution of the budgetary impact of 
enlargement on the years 2004-05 and establishing the principles guiding the 2007-13 
financial perspectives). It was, therefore, no coincidence that the negotiation road map 
approved in Göthemburg in June 2001 to establish the negotiation chapters that each 
Presidency should open, negotiate and close, de-railed in the first semester of 2002 when 
the chapters with the heaviest financial implications (agriculture and structural funds) 
were placed on the table, with only a bilateral negotiation between France and Germany 
getting the process back on track again. The compromise, made public the night before 
the extraordinary European Council meeting of Brussels of October 2002, reflected well 
the dominant logic of this final phase of the enlargement game: Germany committed itself 
to preserving the Common Agricultural Policy, so dear to France’s interests, in return for 
an agreement to stabilize EU expenditure (in real terms, to reduce it) in order to assure 
Germany that its contributions to the budget would not rise as a result of enlargement. 
Once again, a utility-maximizing logic prevailed on the part of EU governments while, at 
the same time, the final result quite vividly reflected the existing power asymmetries 
within the EU10. 
 
Similarly, EU member states accommodated the institutional effects of enlargement in a 
manner which reflected much more a goal of maximizing power than of maximizing the 
EU’s collective efficiency or democratic legitimacy. As the candidates were many and 
predominantly poor in terms of the EU’s average wealth and mostly small in terms of 
population, the features of the historic system of vote allocation in the Council of Ministers 
                                                          
9 Agence Europe No. 7950, 23/IV/2001, ‘Spain Does Not Want its Poorest Regions Penalised by 
Enlargement’. 
10 Agence Europe No. 8326, 25/X/2002, ‘France and Germany Reach Agreement Over Agricultural 
Expenditure’. 
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would mean a dangerous over-representation of the new members in the Council 
(Schmitter and Torreblanca, 1997). As a consequence, by way of a hard-fought 
reweighing of the votes of each member state in the Council, the Treaty of Nice 
substantially shifted the distribution of power in the EU from the small and medium-sized 
to the largest EU member states thus ensuring that the enlarged EU would not fall in the 
hands of the new members (Baldwin and Widgren, 2003). 
 
 
3. Eastern Enlargement from the Perspective of the EU’s Collective Identity 
Having extensively examined the path and content of enlargement negotiations, it is 
tempting to conclude that instrumentally-oriented negotiations and a logic of power or 
utility-maximization exhaust the explanation of the phenomenon of enlargement. To the 
extent to which enlargement has taken place, it may be argued, it is because member 
states have been able to trade their particular interests one off against another, impose 
the remaining costs on the candidates or dilute them over time so as to diffuse present or 
potential conflicts. Yet, we argue in this section, there are some significant actions in the 
process that seem to respond to a different kind of logic, ie, a logic of appropriateness. 
 
According to the logic of appropriateness, either state preferences are clearly defined a 
priori on the basis of a common identity and therefore converging to a very similar stance, 
or a collective self-understanding process takes place to decide what is the ‘right thing to 
do’ in accordance with shared values. In any case, the goal of the collective decision is to 
develop and protect the sense of ‘we-ness’ and to establish bonds of solidarity with those 
considered members of the same family. 
 
Looking at enlargement, there are a set of clearly-cut instances in which EU actions seem 
to be motivated by considerations which have more to do with a common identity and 
shared values than with a matter of efficiency and promotion of member states’ interests. 
These are: first, the building of a special relationship between the EU and Central Eastern 
Europe from 1989 to 1992; secondly, the relevance of value-based arguments to convert 
this initial policy into an enlargement commitment in Copenhagen in 1993; and thirdly, the 
decision of the Luxembourg Council to start accession negotiations with all candidates at 
the same time despite the fact that some of them failed to meet the criteria which the 
Commission had set in its Agenda 2000 report of July 1997. In all three instances, EU 
decisions also reflected an agreement on the ‘right thing to do’ according to a common 
identity and shared values, rather than a balance of the material costs and benefits 
implied. 
 
The birth of the special relationship between the EC and the CEECs was the result of a 
collective self-understanding process that, having commenced before, became very clear 
from 1988 on. During the Cold War, relations between the EC and Eastern Europe had 
hardly existed. Nonetheless, EC institutions and governments had deemed the 
integration project incomplete because of the involuntary exclusion of the CEECs, at the 
same time that they had been conforming their collective identity and shared values as 
the ‘counter-image’ of the other side of the Wall. When Communism collapsed in these 
countries, a ‘special responsibility’ emerged to overcome the division of Europe and to 
support their economic and democratic transformation, as was reiteratively mentioned in 
public discourses. The discussions on the aftermath of the Cold War were about the ‘right 
thing to do’ according to the Community’s identity, and the member states’ response was 
in line with the role they were expected to play, both by their respective constituencies 
and by other international actors, such as the CEECs or the US. 
 
At Rhodes in December 1988 the European Council reaffirmed its ‘determination to act 
with renewed hope to overcome the division of the continent and to promote the Western 
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values and principles which Member States have in common’11. The year after, in 
Strasbourg, it made a commitment to fully meet its responsibilities vis-á-vis countries with 
which it maintained all manner of links and relationships, historical and geographical in 
origin, and concluded that ‘the Community and its Member States are fully conscious of 
the common responsibility which devolves on them in this decisive phase in the history of 
Europe’12. At the beginning of 1990, Prime Minister Charles Haughey affirmed on behalf 
of the Irish Council Presidency that ‘the EC can and must do more than anyone else... (it) 
has an enormous load of responsibility towards East Europe’ (Torreblanca, 2001, 51). As 
Sjursen (2002, 503) has stressed, the dominant argument was that Eastern Europe ‘is a 
part of us that now must be returned’. Accordingly, the EC should and did assume the 
leadership in international assistance to the area. After a debate on what the EC wanted 
to become according to the goals and values deriving from its identity –that is, the 
process of self-understanding to decide which policy to prescribe for the new situation–, 
the member states’, following a ‘logic of appropriateness’, accepted to play their expected 
role and decided to strengthen cooperation to promote democracy and liberty and to 
encourage economic reforms, coming up with a consensual decision which went 
unchallenged by any of them. 
 
Accordingly, the EC’s initial response to the CEECs’ demands for membership was the 
recognition of a special responsibility towards them. This responsibility found its practical 
expression in a set of association agreements which essentially dealt with trade 
liberalization, economic assistance and political cooperation. This policy decision 
responded to the idea of ‘concentric circles’, regarded as a solution to the widening-
versus-deepening debate. With the so-called European Agreements, Europe’s 
architecture could be restructured in the Community’s interests and the moral duty to help 
the new democracies and overcome the division of the continent could also be met. By 
way of a virtuous circle, the political conditionality clauses inserted in the agreements not 
only served EU member states’ identities as democracies based on the rule of law and 
respect for human rights but also served the Twelve’s security interests quite well. 
 
This common identity also played an essential role in effecting the evolution from a 
special foreign policy (different from that concerning third countries and specified in the 
Phare Programme and the European Agreements) to an enlargement policy. It was at the 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993 that the Twelve formally offered 
membership to all the Central and Eastern European countries that had signed 
association agreements with the EU, and laid out the conditions which candidate 
countries should meet in order to be admitted into the EU. The absence of a debate on 
the topic of enlargement at the Council meeting itself, as well as the agendas of the 
preceding European Council meetings in Lisbon (June 1992), Birmingham (October 
1992) and Edinburgh (December 1992), and the documents prepared by the European 
Commission throughout 1992 and 1993 show a similar pattern: although it had not yet 
been formally announced, enlargement was taken for granted (Torreblanca, 2001, 306-
314). Therefore, the promise of membership to Central and Eastern Europe did not result 
in a heated and wide-spread public debate: it just seemed the natural thing to do in 
accordance with the historic construction of the guiding principles for the enlargement 
policy and the identity defined in the previous self-understanding process. 
 
Finally, value-based arguments were also quite important in order to engineer an 
inclusive mechanism for the selection of candidates and the opening of negotiations at 
                                                          
11 ‘European Council in Rhodes, 2-3 December 1988, Presidency Conclusions’, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, 12/1988, p. 8-13. 
12 ‘European Council in Strasbourg, 8-9 December 1989, Presidency Conclusions’, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, 12/1989, p. 8-18. 
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the Luxembourg Council of December 1997. Whereas the Agenda 2000 opted for a 
negotiation model based on objective criteria, a group of member states led by Sweden, 
Denmark and Italy launched a competing framework, in which the decision to open 
negotiations was questioned as an excessively apolitical and bureaucratic exercise (Friis, 
1998, 6). What was at stake was the continent’s future stability and peace, and if the EU 
left some countries out of the negotiation process, they could perceive it as a ‘new 
dividing line’. These countries managed to link their framework to the core of the EU’s 
self-image, the very fact that the EU had presented itself as a club for all Europeans, with 
the substitution of age-old rivalries by peace and stability and the reinforcement of 
democracy as its goals. The result was that in Luxembourg the Fifteen agreed to allow all 
the candidates to initiate the first phase of the negotiations at the same time. 
 
Definitive proof of the importance of identity in the EU’s enlargement policy is provided by 
Turkey’s place in this policy. While Central and Eastern European countries had always 
been considered part of the European family of nations, with this being a sufficient reason 
for accepting and promoting their accession, implicit reluctance towards Turkey’s 
candidature might be due to its consideration as less than European in both a cultural 
and religious sense. A stronger feeling of kinship with the CEECs might have created a 
stronger sense of moral obligation, responsibility and duty towards them than with respect 
to other candidates such as Turkey. In fact, on the eve of the Copenhagen Council, 
Turkey presented a similar situation in relation with political rights and civil liberties to 
those of other candidates such as Estonia and Latvia, and an even better one than 
Romania13. Ten years after, despite Romania ranking poorly in some well-established 
political rankings (such as Transparency International), it has been confirmed that it will 
become a EU member from 200714. The hypothesis that the EU should prioritize 
enlargement to states towards which it has a particular sense of kinship-based duty can 
thus be at least partly confirmed (Lundgren, 2002). 
 
This particular sense of kinship has also influenced the member states’ preferences with 
regards to the selection of candidates. For instance, given its past and experiences, 
Spain has always felt the obligation to support Eastern enlargement (Jáuregui, 2002, 
Torreblanca 2002). This kinship-based argument was also used by Spanish 
representatives to justify their position in favour of opening negotiations with all the 
candidates at the same time. Alternatively, some member states justified their preference 
for a more limited process given their special kinship with certain candidates. Both 
Denmark’s special emphasis on enlargement to the Baltic states and Germany’s to 
Poland and Hungary, were justified by their governments in terms of historic affinity which 
bolstered stronger bonds of solidarity towards them15. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Freedom House, Country ratings (www.freedomhouse.org). In Freedom House’ index, political rights and 
civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and 
seven the lowest. Turkey got in 1992 a 2 for the political rights (the best score together with Poland and 
Hungary) and a 4 for the civil liberties (the worst score together with Romania). 
14 The Corruption Perceptions Index, by Transparency International, relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people, academics, and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) 
and 0 (highly corrupt), with a score for Turkey in 2003 of 3.1 and for Romania of 2.8. 
15 Papers presented at the CIDEL Workshop ‘Justifying Enlargement: Past and Present Experiences – A 
Principled Account’, in Ávila (Spain), on 7-8 May 2004: by S. Piedrafita, ‘Ifs and Buts of Spain’s Eastern 
Enlargement Policy’; by M. Riddervold and H. Sjursen, ‘Between Security and Human Rights: Denmark 
and the Enlargement of the EU’; and by M. Zaborowski, ‘Germany and EU Enlargement: From 
Rapprochement to “Reproachment”’. 
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4. Eastern Enlargement as a Deliberative Process 
Exchanging Arguments, Not Interests 
As stated in the introduction, whereas both the logic of consequentiality and the parallel 
logic of appropriateness can account for a fair number of the decisions relating to 
enlargement, they might still fall short of capturing the deliberative aspects of the 
enlargement process. How would enlargement look from the perspective of our third 
logic? In Table 2, we suggest four sets of empirical markers which might reveal the 
functioning of a logic of justification when applied to the particular case of EU 
enlargement. These have to do with: (1) the decision-making process; (2) the goals 
decision-makers might be seeking; (3) the types of outcomes we might expect; and, 
finally, (4) the type of justifications actors might resort to in order to obtain support and 
approval for the decisions adopted. 
 
Table 2. Fitting Enlargement to Each of the Three Logics. 
  
Logic of 
Consequentiality 
 
 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
 
Logic of Justification 
 
Decision-
making 
process 
A bargaining process 
with fixed preferences in 
which actors anticipate 
consequences and 
behave strategically 
regardless of the well-
being of others 
A process of self-
reflection in which 
actors behave 
according to what 
their identities or roles 
prescribe them to do 
A communicative 
process where parties 
exchange arguments 
and assess their 
validity and legitimacy 
 
Goals 
To promote the interests 
and preferences of the 
member states rather 
than accommodate the 
candidates’ interests 
To construct or 
strengthen a 
collective identity and 
to establish bonds of 
solidarity with the 
candidate countries 
To produce a 
legitimate system of 
governance at the 
supranational level 
 
Outcome 
A utility-maximizing 
decision which reflects 
the power distribution of 
the participants in the 
policy game 
A decision expressing 
collective resolve 
regarding a particular 
way of life and set of 
values 
A decision reflecting 
the best argument on 
the table according to 
universally-valid 
standards and the 
EU’s constitutive 
principles 
 
Justification 
Pragmatic or utilitarian: if 
agreements are said to 
be better than the status 
quo 
Communitarian: if 
agreements are 
congruent with the 
shared values, 
common identity and 
goals 
Rights or civic-based: if 
decisions are adopted 
despite being contrary 
to material interests 
because they are said 
to enhance values 
such as democracy or 
human rights 
 
Consider, for example, the decision to enlarge. The Copenhagen decision of June 1993 
was the result of challenging with arguments the initial policy of association and its 
developing instruments. Throughout 1992 and 1993, the former Communist countries had 
started to encounter difficulties at different levels (political, economic or ethnic) in their 
transition processes. Prominent political and opinion leaders, the media and important 
sectors of the academic and policy community (including influential think-tanks) publicly 
exposed the inconsistencies between the EU’s declared association policy goals and its 
achievements. As a consequence, some member states (Germany, the UK and 
Denmark) could convincingly argue that a mere ‘special relationship’ was not congruent 
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anymore with the promise of supporting democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (and 
the moral obligation to do so). Starting in Lisbon in June 1992, the Commission, with the 
support of some member states, offered new arguments to challenge the previous policy 
and asked for more committed political action in order to effectively achieve the goals of 
overcoming the continent’s divisions and spreading stability and peace. As a result of this 
deliberation, a majority of member states ended up agreeing with the diagnosis of 
increased instability in Central and Eastern Europe and, as a consequence, with the 
inadequacy of the EU’s association policy. However, reluctant member states countered 
with another argument: that neither the candidates nor the EU were prepared for 
accession. Finally, a consensus was reached on ‘the better argument’ that all member 
states could live with, which reflected the legitimate demands of both sides. With the 
exacting (yet vague and discretionary) membership conditions agreed upon at 
Copenhagen, no reluctant country found further legitimate arguments to oppose 
enlargement. 
 
Similarly, the justification of enlargement has been predominantly moral, not economic: 
all actors have accepted that enlargement would be for the good of the EU over the long 
term although costly in the short term. Therefore, when it came to set the timing for the 
enlargement negotiations, the various policy options available were discussed not only in 
terms of cost/benefits to the EU but also in terms of factual and normative adequacy, ie, 
in terms of their legitimacy and justification. Owing to this logic, opposing enlargement 
with the argument of its heavy costs has never been considered a legitimate argument, 
and actors reluctant about enlargement have been forced to frame their arguments in 
different terms. Since the enlargement acquis prescribed that membership was 
conditional on being European, democratic and wishing to respect in full the acquis, 
arguments in favour of a faster or a slower enlargement could only be framed in terms of 
the integrity of the Union and the acquis or the democratic character of the candidates. 
As a consequence, those member states reluctant to accept enlargement were forced to 
argue either that the candidates would never be able to implement the acquis or, 
alternatively, that because the rule of law was weak and minorities were not respected, 
the political conditions for membership were not met. However, each of these arguments 
could be factually or normatively discussed, and even if the arguments were proved right, 
remedies could be put in place. The Balladur Plan launched in 1993 to contain minority 
tensions in Central and Eastern Europe, the structured foreign policy dialogue 
established in Essen in 1994, the 1995 White Paper spelling out the legal adaptations on 
which the candidates had to embark to accede to the Single Market, the inclusion in the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty of a wider definition of democracy and the sanctions associated 
to any likely breach of the conditions in article F.1, updated and upgraded the 
enlargement acquis to meet the needs of a new situation and make enlargement 
compatible with the preservation of the EU’s goals and values. 
 
Likewise, the selection of candidates for the opening of accession negotiations can be 
described in deliberative terms. Following the European Council meeting in Madrid in 
December 1995 and the conclusions of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the EU 
had established the principle of ‘relative merit’ as the basis of its policy for dealing with 
candidates’ applications16. Accordingly, the 1997 Luxembourg Presidency called on the 
Commission to make an ‘objective evaluation’ of the applicant states’ ability to join, even 
if this meant a differentiated approach and that some states would be left out in the first 
round17. But when the Commission, following these recommendations, decided to invite 
only five candidates to start accession negotiations, some member states challenged this 
decision with the argument that new dividing lines would be created, subsequently 
                                                          
16 Agence Europe, 1951-1952, 27/IX/1995. 
17 Agence Europe, 7009, 4/VII/1997. 
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undermining rather than strengthening stability and peace in Europe (Friis 1998). After an 
intense debate on the virtues of each policy option, the member states agreed on the 
‘regatta policy’ as the most satisfactory (and the fairest) solution. This approach, by which 
all candidates would start negotiations at the same time but conclude them depending on 
their particular progress, satisfied the two principles that EU members wanted to 
preserve: non-discrimination and relative merit18. As a result, testifying to the power of the 
better argument, some member states imposed a policy change not by making credible 
threats or inducing the other member states with larger pay-offs, but by challenging the 
factual and normative basis of the existing policy with the aid of principles which all 
member states could recognize as valid. 
 
Conclusion: Deliberative Supranationalism and Enlargement 
In the introduction to this paper, we stated our aim to examine and discuss European 
enlargement from three different perspectives. We believe we have shown that whereas 
an interest-based perspective, typical of a logic of consequentiality, might fit well with 
much of what enlargement has been about in terms of interest accommodation and cost-
benefit calculations, there is still some space left for considering the role played by EU 
identity in configuring the most important decisions relating to enlargement. Still, by 
looking in greater detail at three key decisions concerning enlargement (the decision to 
enlarge, the timing of the opening of negotiations and the final selection of the 
candidates), we can see that the process was not only dominated by an instrumental 
logic of interest-exchanging and benefit-maximization, but also by a continuous process 
of arguing about the courses of action which best matched the EU’s principles (the 
promotion of peace, security, democracy and an ever closer union of the peoples of 
Europe), followed by a permanent justification (or challenge) of the decisions adopted in 
terms of their better adjustment with these very same principles. 
 
Our findings seem congruent with past experiences of enlargement. Looking back we can 
see how enlargement processes have been about interests (with member states seeking 
to minimize their costs), but also about identities (with member states acting according to 
their shared values and proclaimed identity and enlarging the Union to poor but 
democratizing countries in Southern Europe). However, whereas the exact timing and 
content of each enlargement policy package has depended on the particular correlation 
of forces and interests at each political period, it is undeniable that significant 
enlargement decisions have been reached through a deliberative process in which 
member states have exchanged ‘reasoned reasons’ for their respective claims and 
preferences (ie, arguments rather than threats). Thus, proposals and stances not 
necessarily supported by the most powerful states have prospered as the result of 
reflecting on the ‘better argument’ on the table. 
 
In our view, all this confirms most of the claims of the theory of deliberative 
supranationalism (Eriksen 2000; 2003) concerning its capacity to explain some usually 
neglected features of the policy-making process in specific EU policy fields –particularly 
enlargement (Sjursen 2002)– as well as its adequacy to provide a more precise account 
of what sort of polity the EU might become as a result of how it addresses and solves the 
problems before it (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; 2003). But why? 
 
First, deliberation can be seen as a way of solving collective action problems, such as 
enlargement, in ways which are not only consistent with the particular interests of the 
member states taken individually but also with the EU’s interests as a whole. 
Enlargement is seldom specifically modelled as a collective action dilemma, but it looks 
like one: member states know that enlargement is good for them collectively over the long 
                                                          
18 Agence Europe, 7023, 25/VII/1997. 
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term but individually damaging in the short term in both institutional and economic terms. 
Theoretically, unless member states overcome this collective action dilemma, 
enlargement should result in a collectively suboptimal outcome which satisfies individual 
but not collective preferences. However, by helping legitimate principles accepted by all 
actors to emerge, deliberative processes can solve coordination problems and result in 
increased collective efficiency and legitimacy (Eriksen 2003: 3). 
 
Second, enlargement is a typical case in which costs and benefits are uncertain and/or 
difficult to calculate: they depend on faulty or risky assumptions and can always be 
challenged by unexpected events which cannot be discounted in advance. Complex 
phenomena such as enlargement are therefore difficult to rationalize into a neat balance 
sheet of costs and benefits from which individual actors can decide and hierarchically 
rank their preferences. In cases such as enlargement, preferences might change as the 
process moves on if the initial preferences are challenged by legitimate normative 
arguments or factual events which all actors interpret in the same way. Therefore, 
preferences might not be fixed or stable, actors might discover them as they go, because 
of arguing, and arguing might help them change and adapt. 
 
Third, feelings of shared or collective identities might inform political action with a sense 
of purpose, even a rank of desired outcomes, and in this way might help political leaders 
discard certain policy options in favour of others. That is to say, that they might have a 
constitutive or regulative effect on deciding the direction of the evolving relationship or the 
overall objectives, but then the policy instruments need to be specified. As Sedelmeier 
(2003, 12) has convincingly argued, the more diffuse nature of the standards through 
which the EU’s identity is enacted, the weaker its impact on its foreign policy, thereby 
provinding the scope for interpretation and argumentation about what the ‘right’ course of 
action might be in a particular situation. 
 
Fourth, deliberative supranationalism seems ideally suited for analysis of institutional or 
decision-making settings, such as the EU, in which authority is scattered, power relations 
are often horizontal instead of vertical and policies are the outcome of ‘governance’ rather 
than ‘government’ arrangements. In such settings, ‘reason-giving becomes the only way 
of reaching consensus’ (Eriksen 2003: 14). In the particular case of enlargement, its 
‘composite’ nature, involving many different policy areas, each with its own structure, set 
of actors and negotiation dynamics mean that policy-makers in charge of enlargement 
are forced to engage in a dialogue with policy-makers at the meso-level in order to 
convince them of the need to make concessions so as to ensure an enlargement policy 
coherent with the principles it proclaims. In return, the extent to which policy-makers at 
the meso-level (eg, the Common Agricultural Policy) give in to these demands depends 
not only on the material compensations they can obtain, but also on the validity of the 
arguments (both factual and normative) which they are exposed to. 
 
As a consequence, in situations such as enlargement, with a high degree of uncertainty 
and which admit different alternatives for political action all in compliance with a collective 
identity under construction, there is a greater chance to use arguments to challenge both 
the factual and normative statements on which policies are based and to provide the 
others with legitimate reasons in favour or against particular options. Therefore, the 
interest-oriented account of the enlargement process can be complemented with the fact 
that, prior to any distributive negotiation, actors need to engage in a process of 
deliberation and establish some sort of common basic knowledge so as to agree on a 
collective definition of the situation and the advantages of their different policy options in 
order to achieve the agreed goals. 
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When looking at enlargement, we conclude that member states have not only defended 
their own interests, but have also felt obliged to justify their actions and comply with 
norms and principles accepted by all. Some important decisions were taken as result of 
agreement about the ‘right thing to do’, following a deliberative process in which all the 
parties involved had to defend their stances with arguments considered legitimate by all. 
As a result, the legitimacy of enlargement is not only and exclusively utilitarian, ie, based 
on the benefits of enlargement, but also on both the values which the EU promotes and 
the fairness and consistency with which the EU applies them. Therefore, when describing 
enlargement, Puchala’s blind men might continuously stumble into costs and benefits of 
varying sizes and aspects. However, beneath the rugged surface of this elephant called 
the EU, persistently blind men might also find arguments, which citizens might share, to 
justify the need to proceed along with EU enlargement despite its costs. Unfortunately, 
this type of legitimizing strategy, which should result in a much more democratic and 
deeply integrated EU, is seldom employed to effect. 
 
Sonia Piedrafita and José I. Torreblanca 
UNED University and Elcano Royal Institute 
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